This paper analyses equilibrium fares that arise from Collusion, Cournot, Stackelberg, Bertrand and Sequential Price Competition when two profit maximising transport firms produce symmetrically differentiable services and have identical costs. Special focus is placed on how different equilibrium fares are linked to trip length. Higher operator costs and higher demand from the authorities regarding the quality of transport supply result in steeper relationships (larger rate of change) between all fares and travel distance. Also, a higher degree of substitutability between the services will in most cases make these relationships steeper. The competitive situation has less influence on fares, both absolutely and relatively, the longer routes the operators compete on.
INTRODUCTION
Throughout Europe and North America there has been a move in markets for public passenger transport towards a reduction in economic regulation (Banister et al., 1992) . This has paved the way for increased competition between private companies to supply services both on subsidised contracts for the local government and commercially operated in the free-market.
The deregulation has been the subject of many studies both with respect to privatization (Nash, 2005) and types of competitive contracts (e.g. Hensher and Stanley, 2003; Preston, 2005) . The liberalization of the British bus industry has given examples of fierce competition (Nash, 1993) . Also within the railway industry a scope for on-track competition has been identified with fare reductions as a feasible outcome (Preston et al., 1999) . Preston et al. (1999) states that the competition within the rail industry is, much like coach and air transport, characterised by a higher potential for differentiation of products compared to that of the bus industry which to a larger extent provides a homogenous service.
On many transport routes, one, two or three suppliers are commonplace. Despite being competitors, such a limited number of suppliers of transport services can act in a collusive regime of some form when it comes to setting the price and/or the capacity. The strategic interactions between firms in such markets have been discussed theoretically by Pedersen (1999) and van Reeven (2003) and empirically found to be present e.g. in the Norwegian aviation industry (Salvanes et al., 2003) and in the British bus industry following the deregulation (e.g. Beesley, 1990) . However, models of imperfect competition are scarcely used in order to analyse how the level of fare is related to travel distance or the length between the destinations.
Theoretical works the last five years have, admittedly, dealt with how a monopolist will design the relationship between fare and trip length when it: (1) maximises profits or a weighted combination of profits and consumer surplus and (2) under different assumptions regarding the relationship between transport users demand and their generalised travel cost, see and Jørgensen and Preston (2007) . Later on these models are seen in the light of empirical studies from passenger transport in Norway (Mathisen, 2008b) . Tsai et al. (2008) also develop a procedure in order to estimate simultaneously how fare, headway and transport quality on one hand should be related to trip length on the other hand, given one operator who wants to maximise profits. The latter analysis is carried out using an intercity transportation system as an example. Nevertheless, none of these works 3 analyse the relationship between optimal fare and travel distance when two or more rivals compete.
The aim of this paper is to analyse how fares are related to travel distance between locations when two profit maximising operators, producing symmetrically differentiated services, either collude or compete. In order to do so, we calculate equilibrium prices under Collusion, under quantity competition (Cournot and Stackelberg) and under price competition (Bertrand and Leader-Follower) . The analysis is carried out under different degrees of substitutability in demand between the two transport services. Comparisons of the equilibrium solutions inform the transport authorities of the consequences of different regulatory policies for passengers travelling on routes of different lengths.
The structure of the article is as follows. In section 2, we present the model and emphasise its central assumptions. In section 3, we solve for the market equilibrium at both Collusion and simultaneous and sequential competition on both quantity and price. Section 4 provides the analysis where special focus is placed on deriving the link between equilibrium fares and trip length and implications of the equilibrium fare solutions on passengers' generalised travel costs. In section 5 we briefly relate the model results to empirical evidence. Lastly, in section 6, we make some concluding remarks and present the implications for policy makers.
THE MODEL
Let us assume that two transport firms provide their own version of a transport service at the given distance (D) between the two locations Y and Z, as illustrated in Figure 1 . We want to analyse the changes in equilibrium prices under different competitive situations when the transport distance (D) between the locations changes. The degree of substitutability between the transport services depends on how equal the travellers perceive them to be; the more equal perceptions they have about them, the more substitutable are the services.
Insert Figure 1 about here.
Let us denote a representative transport user's generalised travel costs of using service 1 and service 2 by G 1 and G 2 , respectively. G i , where i = {1, 2}, is given by the sum of fare, P i , and the time costs, (b 0 + b 1 D), see for example Button (2010) . Note that we suppose that time costs of travelling with the two suppliers are the same and exogenous for them; i.e. we assume that the quality demands are set by the authorities. Hence, generalised travel costs using the two services can only differ through the fares P 1 and P 2 .
This means that our model applies to cases where two suppliers using the same type of mode compete, for example both offering bus transport, air transport etc. Since other factors than G i such as the modes' departure-and arrival times, their safety records, travellers' habits and the firms' brand image also influence modal choice, the two services are not necessarily perfect substitutes, even though they offer the travellers the same G-values.
In the following we follow the model originally presented by Singh and Vives (1984) by assuming that a representative traveller has the following utility function based on the levels of the use of services supplied by firm 1, X 1 , and firm 2, X 2
where the parameter   1 , 0  s measures the degree of substitutability between the services offered by the two operators. If s = 1 then the services are perfect substitutes and s = 0 is the 1 Assuming k is time costs per hour and h is the mode's speed measured in km per hour. Then b 1 = k / h. This suggests that b 1 is low (high) for fast (slow) modes. The b 0 parameter is in general high for air transport compared to other modes. The k-value and thereby the b 1 -value will be lower the better the service and quality onboard.
5 case of independent markets; hence this parameter can be thought of as indicating the degree of competition between the firms in any specific market situation, see also comments below equation (5).
Assuming that the representative traveller maximises his consumer surplus, CS
, the utility function in (2) gives rise to the following linear and symmetric inverse demand functions
Since Singh and Vives (1984) focus on price (Bertrand) and quantity (Cournot) competition within a duopoly framework their model is relevant for the problem we aim to model. The clear-cut conclusions between Bertrand and Cournot which they made have, admittedly, been subject to critique for example in an n-firm specification where it is not evident which type of competition that is more efficient (Häckner, 2000) . It has also been demonstrated that Bertrand could give higher prices than Cournot when the firms have goals that extend beyond profit maximisation (Clark et al., 2009 ) and even higher prices than monopoly when the spatial dimension is included (Sanner, 2007) .
The expressions of generalised costs in (1) are inserted in the inverse demand function in (3) giving the following linear symmetric demand fare functions
From (4) follows that higher values of b 0 and b 1 due to poorer transport quality lead to negative shifts in these inverse demand functions. The direct demand functions derived from (4) are presented in (5)
From ( 
. The effect that increasing s has on the elasticity is 0
. Hence as products become more similar, the elasticity becomes more negative, and demand is more elastic. Lower values of s gives the providers the possibility of increasing fare without so much loss of demand.
Since we assume operators with the same type of mode compete and additionally simplify the analysis by assuming no variation in efficiency levels between them, we specify the cost for providing the transport services with the following identical linear functions (Pels and Rietveld, 2000) , and the above functions in particular are supported from several empirical cost studies carried out for bus (Jørgensen and Preston, 2003) and ferry transport Mathisen, 2008a) in Norway.
From (6) it follows that 
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Marginal costs increase linearly with trip length. The a 1 parameter can be interpreted as the distance-independent marginal costs, while a 2 is the costs for the transport firm of carrying a passenger an extra km.
The profit for each firm, i  , are expressed in (8) using the demand functions in (3) and the cost functions in (5):
The profit functions can also be written in terms of fares using expression (5) in combination with (8). We then get:
MARKET SOLUTIONS FOR DIFFERENT COMPETITIVE SITUATIONS
The conditions for maximising the profit functions in (8) and (9) give us equilibrium quantities and fares. The equilibrium fare expressions will be deduced with the purpose of deriving how optimal fares are linked to operators' costs ( 1 a and 2 a ), the quality of transport Hence, a total of seven different equilibrium fares and quantities will be deduced.
The profit expressions for each firm in equilibrium, 
Equilibrium fares and quantities

Simultaneous Quantity Competition (Cournot)
When the transport operators maximise their profits by choice of the quantity variable we get the following common equilibrium quantity, C X * , and fare,
Sequential Quantity Competition (Stackelberg)
Let firm 1 be the leader choosing its quantity, first. Using equation (8) These standard market models from the industrial organization literature (see e.g. Carlton and Perloff, 2005; Frank, 2010) are the shared monopoly (collusion or cartel), the simultaneous quantity competition (Cournot), the sequential quantity competition (Stackelberg), the simultaneous price competition (Bertrand) and the sequential price competition (Price Leader-Follower). 4 It can be verified from the firms' profit expressions in equilibrium that maximum travel distance, (9) gives the common equilibrium quantity, B X * , and fare, B P * , in simultaneous fare competition shown in (12).
Sequential Fare Competition
Let us assume that firm 1 sets price first. The derived equilibrium quantities ) , ( 
Collusion
In this case the operators maximise
and we the get the following equilibrium quantity and fare for each operator (14) 2
Influence on fares of changes in a, b and s parameters
Using equations (10), (11), (12), (13) and (14) it can be determined that all equilibrium fares are increasing in the operators' costs ( 1 a and 2 a ) and decreasing when the passengers' time costs ( 0 b and 1 b ) increase. Consequently, higher demands from the authorities regarding the quality of the transport supply, causing lower values of 0 b and 1 b , will increase fares.
Furthermore, higher degree of substitutability between the firms' services (s increases) will reduce all fares except for the collusive case; fare is then independent of the value of s.
Ranking of Fares
All equilibrium fares are lower when the firms compete than when they collude. In summary, the following ranking can be verified when all parameter values are positive
Bertrand competition yields lowest fares and Collusion highest fares when s > 0. This ranking corresponds with the results found in ordinary textbooks dealing with duopoly models, profit maximising entities and linear cost-and demand functions, see for example Frank (2010) .
Using this ranking and making pair wise comparison of fares gives a total of 21 fare gaps 5 .
Common for all of these is that they will all be reduced when the firms' cost ( 0 a and 1 a ) and trip length (D) increase. Also, lower demands regarding transport quality resulting in increased passengers' time cost ( 0 b and 1 b ) will reduce the fare differences.
More substitutable services (s increases), will increase the differences between the Collusion fare and all other equilibrium fares. Generally speaking, the differences in equilibrium fares under quantity competition on one hand and price competition on the other hand increase in s.
The difference between the Stackelberg follower's fare and leader's fare, ) ( 
TRAVEL DISTANCE AND FARES -FURTHER ANALYSIS
Conditions for Increasing Fares with Distance
The conditions for increasing fares with distance for Cournot, Stackelberg, Bertrand, Sequential fare setting and Collusion can be found using equations (10), (11), (12), (13) and (14), respectively. From (10) we can deduce the following conditions at Cournot competition:
The derivative of C P * with respect to distance (D) shows that the function is monotonic and will be either positive or negative depending on the parameter values a 2 , b 1 and s. The higher the costs of transporting a passenger an extra km (a 2 ), the lower the extra time costs for each passenger of being transported an extra km (b 1 ) and the more substitutable services the operators produce the more likely it is that fare increases with travel distance. When s = 0.5, for example, the fare increases with distance provided that the .
Under Stackelberg competition we get the following conditions using equation (11) Furthermore, the following conditions can be worked out for sequential fare setting using equation (13) 13 ( 
Ranking of the Equilibrium Fares Regarding their Dependence on Trip Length
The differentiations of the fare functions with respect to distance under different forms of competition given in equations (15) 
The Influence of Parameter Values
It has been demonstrated in the previous sections that, for all competitive situations, the influence that the trip length exerts on equilibrium fares depends on the three parameters a 2 , b 1 and s. From equations (15), (16), (17), (18) Even though the ranking of the derivatives in (20) is independent of a 2 , b 1 and s, the magnitudes of their differences are; it can easily be determined that the values of all the 21 derivative differences are increasing in a 2 and b 1 . Provided that s is not very high (s < 0.83), it can be verified that increasing s will also make the differences between the derivatives larger. 
Summarised Model Results for Fare and Distance
The most important conclusions above are summarised in Figure 3 and Figure 4 . Figure 3 describes the most common situation, namely that all fares increase in distance. This applies to all combinations of a 2 and b 1 such that a 2 /b 1 > 1. Figure 3 shows that the differences between all equilibrium fares, both relatively and absolutely decrease when trip length (D) increases. Increasing a 2 and decreasing b 1 make all relationships shifting upwards and being steeper. Except for the collusive case higher degree of substitutability between the services (higher s) makes all curves shifting downwards but being steeper. From section 3.2 follows too that all curves get closer to each other when a 2 and b 1 increase. An increase in s has an ambiguous effect, making some curves move closer together, while others do not.
Insert 
Influence on Traveller's Generalised Cost
Inserting the equilibrium fares in equation (1) Note that the above results rest upon the assumption that that higher quality demand from the authorities will boost the operators' productivity such that their costs are held constant. This assumption is not unreasonable; in particular for subsidised and/or publically own transport firms X-inefficiency may be present leading to scope for productivity improvements (Button, 2010) . 7 If operators' cost increase when quality is raised, the effect on j G * is ambiguous. 
MODEL RESULTS SEEN IN THE LIGHT OF PREVIOUS NORWEGIAN STUDIES
In the work carried out by Jørgensen and Preston (2007) parameter values for a 2 and b 1 for the year 2002 are worked out using earlier empirical studies concerning bus transport and car ferry transport in Norway. For bus and ferry, respectively, they estimated that the parameter 7 Jørgensen et al. (1997) estimated, for example, the average inefficiency in the regulated Norwegian bus industry in 1991 to be between 7 % and 14 %. 8 When the firms collude (j = {COLL}), conclude that generalised travel costs (G*) will decrease (increase) as the quality (Q) improves when the marginal costs of serving passengers increase less (more) than travellers reductions in generalised costs of the service improvement; that is when
values for a 2 are 1.70 NOK 9 and 4.79 NOK and for b 1 are 1.00 NOK and 6.35 NOK.
Consequently, the fraction a 2 /b 1 is about 1.70 for bus transport and 0.75 for ferry transport.
When relating these findings to Figure 2 we can conclude that bus operators will design a fare system implying increasing fares in distance for all forms of competition and for all degrees of substitutability. For ferry operators, however, fare will decrease with the length of the service when they collude. If they compete and the degree of substitutability between the services is sufficiently high (s > 0.4), Figure 2 shows that also ferry fares will be positively related to distance. If the competition between the operators is moderate such that s < 0.3, fares will decrease with distance for all forms of competition. When the ferry operators offer their services between the same destinations and therefore probably use the same quays, the variation in these services is low both respect to route choice and ferry size. It is, therefore, likely that the services provided by two operators are highly substitutable meaning that the svalue is high so that fares increase with distance.
Norwegian studies that review the relationships between ordinary fares and travel distance for subsidised domestic bus, ferry, train and air transport in Norway, show close positive relationships for all these modes (Mathisen, 2008b) . Bearing in mind that every Norwegian ferry operator meets low competition from other operators such that s is low, the above observations seem to be in conflict with the model's conclusions as far as ferry transport is concerned. In that respect it is, however, worth noting that our model assumes profit maximising operators whilst the ferry fares in Norway are set by the central authorities and they have goals that extend beyond profit maximization; for example the well-being of the travellers. It can be deduced that the more weight a single operator (monopolist) places on consumer surplus compared to profits, the positive relationship between fares and trip length will be steeper and the increase in actual fare with distance will approach the marginal costs for the operator of transporting a passenger (car) an extra km (a 2 ). Using the above mentioned a 2 and b 1 figures for buses and ferries, it can be derived that fares for bus transport always increase with distance irrespective of the weight the bus operator places on profit versus consumer surplus. For ferry transport, fares will increase with distance provided that the 19 single company puts less than four times higher weight on profit than on consumer surplus.
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A thorough discussion of this matter is given in Jørgensen and Preston (2007) . SAS has, thus, both higher transport production and higher full fare prices than NAS on these two services. These results seen in combination with the models' results above indicate that neither Stackelberg competition nor sequential fare competition are present on these routes.
Historical fares on unregulated air transport between central destinations in
Stackelberg competition implies namely that the leader has highest fare but lowest quantity whilst sequential fare competition implies that the leader has lowest price and highest quantity; that is
. The absence of both Stackelberg and sequential fare competition in the Norwegian airline industry is supported from a study of the competitive situation in the industry after its deregulation in 1994, see Salvanes et al. (2003) . Their study indicates that the air companies had a semicollusive behaviour; that is they collude in fares and compete in capacities. It is also worth noting that our model assumes that both firms have identical cost structure. This is not true for as far as 10 According to Jørgensen and Preston (2007) 
20
SAS and NAS are concerned; NAS is regarded as a low cost company and is run more cost efficiently than SAS.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
The main purpose of this paper has been to analyse how the equilibrium fares that arise from Collusion, Cournot, Stackelberg, Bertrand and Price leader-follower competition are linked to: (1) transport operators' costs; (2) the quality of transport supply; (3) the degree of substitutability between the transport services and (4) the trip length. The analysis is carried out by assuming profit maximising transport operators that have identical costs and produce symmetrically substitutable services. Moreover, the quality of transport supply is set by public authorities and, thus, exogenous for the transport operators.
The analysis shows, as expected, that all equilibrium fares increase when the operators' costs increase and when the authorities demand a higher quality of transport supply. If we disregard the Collusion case, more intense competition between the transport firms will decrease fares.
The Collusion fare is globally the highest, whilst Cournot competition yields highest fares and
Bertrand competition lowest fares when the firms compete. The internal ranking of the equilibrium fares is independent of the firms' costs, the quality of their transport services, the degree of substitutability between their services and trip length. These factors influence, however, the magnitudes of the differences in price values. Less cost efficient firms, lower demands regarding transport quality and longer trip lengths will reduce the differences between all equilibrium fares. On the other hand, more substitutable services (higher value of s) will increase fare gaps across different market situations; the gap between fares under quantity competition and fare competition is especially affected.
A more in-depth look at the relationships between equilibrium fares and trip length shows that all competitive situations imply increasing relationships between fares and travel distance when the costs for the operators of transporting a passenger an extra km exceed each passenger's time costs of travelling another km; that is when 0 ) ( and s. Since all aspects with transport quality captured in generalised travel costs are equal for both operators, ranking of these costs are in accordance with the fare rankings; that is Collusion gives highest generalised costs and Bertrand lowest generalised costs etc. Given that higher demands from the authorities regarding transport quality not will increase the operators' costs but improve their productivity 12 , we can conclude unambiguously that generalised travel costs will be reduced. Hence, such transport policy initiatives will benefit the transport users.
To sum up, the competitive situation between transport firms has higher importance on fares and thereby on passengers' generalised travel costs, the more productive the firms are, the higher demands the authorities set regarding the quality of transport supply and, broadly speaking, the more substitutable services they produce. This suggests, for example, that it is more important for the transport users that collusion is hindered when operators' productivity is high, passengers' time costs are low (fast speed modes) and competition is high. Since passengers' time costs in general have increased over time due to rises in income, the way the transport firms compete has become more important for the transport users. Another important finding is that the competitive situation exerts more influence on fares, both absolutely and relatively, on shorter trips than on longer trips. Transport regulators should, thus, focus most on the organisation of transport supply on short routes. Higher productivity among the transport firms, higher degree of substitutability between their services and lower demands regarding transport quality makes the latter recommendation even more relevant.
APPENDIX
The profit functions for the different types of competition with corresponding first-and second order derivatives with respect to distance are presented in this appendix. The positive restrictions on the equilibrium quantities imply that 0 ) 1 (
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